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Abstract
In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive proce-
dures for dening a social group. The rst procedure starts with the
This is a substantial revision of our CentER Discussion Paper 2003-10, Tilburg Uni-
versity, with the same title. D. Dimitrov gratefully acknowledges nancial support from
the German Research Foundation (DFG).
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set of all individuals who are dened by everyone in the society as
group members, while the starting point of the second procedure is
the set of all individuals who dene themselves as members of the
social group. Both procedures expand these initial sets by adding
individuals who are considered to be appropriate group members by
someone in the corresponding initial set, and continue inductively un-
til there is no possibility of expansion any more.
JEL Classication: D63, D71.
Keywords: consensus, liberalism, procedure, social identity
1 Introduction
The problem of group identication serves as a background in many so-
cial and economic contexts. For example, when one examines the political
principle of self-determination of a newly formed country, one would like to
dene the extension of a given nationality. Or when a newly arrived person
in Atlanta chooses where to live, the person is interested in nding out a
residential neighborhood that would suit her: Are they my kind of peo-
ple? Do I belong to this neighborhood?In all those contexts, it is typically
assumed that there is a well-dened group of people who share some com-
mon values, beliefs, expectations, customs, jargon, or rituals. Consequently,
questions like how to dene a social groupor who belongs to the social
grouparise. In very recent papers (see Billot (2003), Çengelci and Sanver
(2006), Houy (2006a,b), Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), Miller (2006), Samet
and Schmeidler (2003)) this problem has been related to formal models from
social choice and voting theory.
Kashers (1993) paper on collective identity can be considered as a rst,
non-formal attempt to look at the group identication problem as an aggre-
gation task. In that paper the author views that each individual in a society
has an opinion about every individual, including oneself, whether the latter
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is a member of a group to be formed1. The collective identity of the group
to be formed is then determined by aggregating opinions of all individuals
in the society. The formal link between Kashers approach and the theory
of aggregators mainly developed in economic theory was made by Kasher
and Rubinstein (1997). For this purpose, they provide, among others, an
axiomatic characterization of a liberalaggregator whereby the group con-
sists of those and only those individuals who each of them views oneself a
member of the group (see also Çengelci and Sanver (2006), Houy (2006a),
Miller (2006), Samet and Schmeidler (2003), Sung and Dimitrov (2005)).
The purpose of this paper is to extend the study of the group identica-
tion problem by adding a procedural view in the analysis. This procedural
view allows us to see a collective as a family of groups, subcollectives, each
with its own view of who is a member of the collective, its own sense of
tradition and its own underlying conceptual realm, but each bearing some
resemblance to the other ones(Kasher (1993, p. 70)). More specically, we
axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for determining who is
a member of a social group: a consensus-start-respecting procedure which is
the one introduced by Kasher (1993) and a liberal-start-respecting procedure
which adds a procedural view to the liberal aggregation of Kasher and
Rubinstein (1997).
The structure of both procedures consists of two components: an initial
set of individuals and a rule according to which new individuals are added to
this initial set. As the names of the procedures suggest, the initial set of the
rst procedure consists of all individuals who are dened as group members
1 An analysis of the question how the identity of an individual has been formed or what
is the impact of identity on economic behavior is out of the scope of this paper. With
respect to those questions the interested reader is referred to Sen (1999) and Akerlof and
Kranton (2000), respectively.
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by everyone in the society, while the initial set of the second procedure collects
all individuals who dene themselves as members of the social group. The
extension rule for both procedures is the same: only those individuals who are
considered to be appropriate group members by someone in the corresponding
initial set are added. The application of this rule continues inductively until
there is no possibility of expansion any more.2
An initial set can be interpreted for example as a set of society founders
who choose new society members from a nite set of candidates (see Berga,
Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2004)), and the extension rule (the voting
rule) is voting by quota one, i.e., it is enough for a candidate to receive one
vote in order to be admitted (see Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001)). In
contrast to the cited papers, we study here the problem of group formation
in a social choice setting and do not consider a predesignated set of society
founders. We allow rather for the possibility that the views of all individuals
in the society determine endogenously who is a society founder.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
the basic notation and denitions. Sections 3 discusses the axioms that
are necessary and su¢ cient to reach logically the consensus-start-respecting
procedure and presents our characterization result. Section 4 is devoted to
the corresponding axioms and characterization of the liberal-start-respecting
procedure. We conclude in Section 5 with some nal remarks.
2 For an axiomatic characterization of the aggregator selecting the agents that are
indirectly designated by all individuals in the society the reader is referred to Houy (2006b).
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2 Basic notation and denitions
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng denote the set of all individuals in the society and assume
that n  2. The set of all subsets of N is denoted by P (N). Each individual
i 2 N forms a setGi  N consisting of all society members that in the view of
i have the social identity G. It may be noted that it is possible to have Gi = ;
for some i 2 N . For all i 2 N , when i 2 Gi, we also say that i considers
himself as a G. A prole of views is an n-tuple of vectors G = (G1; : : : ; Gn)
where Gi  N for all i 2 N . Let G be the set of all proles of views, i.e.,
G = (P (N))n. A collective identity function (CIF) F : G ! P (N) assigns
to each prole G 2 G a set F (G)  N of socially accepted group members.
In what follows, we denote by F the set of all collective identity functions.
Kasher (1993) o¤ers a neutral method for dening the collective identity,
i.e., a method which is ... free of any commitment to some partisan view
of the nature of the collective. This method is introduced as follows. For
any G 2 G, let K0(G) = fi 2 N : i 2 Gk for all k 2 Ng. We dene a
CIF being consensus-start-respecting, to be denoted by K(G), as follows: for
each positive integer t, let Kt(G) = Kt 1 (G) [ fi 2 N : i 2 Gk for some
k 2 Kt 1(G)g; and if for some t  0, Kt(G) = Kt+1(G), thenK(G) = Kt(G).
For each G 2 G the procedure K starts with K0 (G) which consists of
all individuals who are viewed by everyone in the society as group members.
Kasher (1993) calls the set K0(G) the incontrovertible coreof a collective
to be dened and he considers it as an initial approximation to an appropri-
ate denition of the group identity. Notice that K0(G) does not reect the
di¤erences in views of who is a Gheld by those who are unquestionably
Gs. Because one is interested in a neutral aggregation rule, an improved
approximationis needed. For each G 2 G, the CIF K now expands the set
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K0 (G) as follows. If, according to some individual i 2 K0 (G) an individual
k 2 N is viewed as a G, then k should be a G collectively. By adding all such
ks to K0 (G), we obtain the set K1(G). We then repeat the above process
with K1 (G) by adding those individuals who are considered as Gs by some
individual inK1 (G) toK1 (G) to obtainK2 (G). Since n is nite, at a certain
step t, we must have Kt(G) = Kt+1(G), i.e., the set Kt (G) can no longer be
expanded. The intuition behind each step of the expansion is in line with
Kashers (1993) argument: every socially accepted G as being newly added
brings a possibly unique new view of being a G collectively with him; since
a collective identity function is supposed to aggregate those views, it must
pay attention to this new individuals G-concept in order to cover the whole
diversity of views in the society about the question what does it mean to
be a G?.
We turn now to the liberal-start-respecting procedure mentioned by Kasher
and Rubinstein (1997). For any G 2 G, let L0(G) = fi 2 N : i 2 Gig. With
the help of L0(G), we dene a CIF being liberal-start-respecting, to be denoted
by L(G), as follows: for each positive integer t, let Lt(G) = Lt 1 (G) [ fi 2
N : i 2 Gk for some k 2 Lt 1(G)g; and if for some t  0, Lt(G) = Lt+1(G),
then L(G) = Lt(G).
Notice that the extension rule for L and K is the same (and so the
intuition behind it), but the initial set is di¤erent: the liberal-start-respecting
procedure starts with L0 (G) which consists of all members of the society who
view themselves as Gs. Thus, the set L0 (G) reects a weak notion of self-
determination: if one considers oneself a member of G, then one should be a
member of G collectively. Therefore, the procedure L reects a strong liberal
view of collective identity3.
3 See, for example, Çengelci and Sanver (2006), Houy (2006a), Kasher and Rubinstein
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To illustrate the above procedures for dening collectively accepted group
members, consider the following example. Let N = f1; 2; 3g and consider the
prole G = (G1; G2; G3) with G1 = f1; 2g; G2 = f2; 3g and G3 = f2g. Then,
for this prole, K0 = f2g, K1 = K0 [ f3g = f2; 3g, K2 = K1. Therefore,
the collectively accepted group members according to the consensus-start-
respecting procedure are collected in the set K = f2; 3g. For the same
prole G of individual views we have L0 = f1; 2g, L1 = L0 [ f3g = f1; 2; 3g,
L2 = L1. Therefore, for the given prole of views, and as a result of the
application of the liberal-start-respecting procedure, we have L = f1; 2; 3g.
It should be noted that, from their respective denitions, for all proles
G 2 G, K(G)  L(G).
3 The consensus-start-respecting procedure
In this section we o¤er an axiomatic characterization of the Kashers method
for dening a social group. For that purpose we start with the following two
axioms a CIF may satisfy.
 A CIF F 2 F satises consensus (C) if for all G 2 G,
 [i 2 Gk for every k 2 N ] implies [i 2 F (G)], and
 [i =2 Gk for every k 2 N ] implies [i =2 F (G)].
 A CIF F 2 F satises irrelevance of an outsiders view 1 (IOV1) if for
all G;G0 2 G and for all i; j 2 N ,
(1997), Miller (2006), Samet and Schmeidler (2003), Sung and Dimitrov (2005). If the
determination of the membership of a social group is a personal matter, there is indeed
some reason to call individuals in L0 as liberals (see Sen (1970)).
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G0j = Gj [ fig, and
G0l = Gl for all l 2 N n fjg,
imply
 [j 62 F (G) and i 62 G0k for some k 2 N ]) [i 2 F (G) i¤ i 2 F (G0)].
Consensus is used by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) to reach logically
their liberalCIF and, in fact, sounds very plausible when imposed as a
requirement on a collective identity function. This axiom says that, if an
individual is dened as a group member by everyone in the society, then this
individual should be considered as a socially accepted group member; and,
correspondingly, if no one denes this individual as a group member, then
he or she should not deserve the social acceptance as a group member.
Irrelevance of an outsiders view 1 is in the spirit of the exclusive self-
determination axiom introduced by Samet and Schmeidler (2003) and it ba-
sically stipulates that if someone is collectively dened as a non-G, then this
persons view about any society member is not relevant in deciding his or her
collective identity. Note however that there is one case, in which the view
of an outsider cannot be deemed as irrelevant; this case corresponds to the
situation in which everyone in the society except the outsider j considers i
as a G, so that the change of js view in favour of i is (via (C)) relevant for
the social identication of i. As the reader can see, we exclude this case in
(IOV1) by requiring that there is a k 2 N such that i 62 G0k. It should also
be noted that (IOV1) is weaker than the exclusive self-determination axiom
used by Samet and Schmeidler (2003).
Consider now a prole G 2 G and the group of socially accepted society
members F (G) generated by a CIF F 2 F that satises both axioms. Our
rst result relates F (G) with the result of the consensus-start-respecting
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procedure K at prole G. As it turns out, K(G) acts as an upper bound for
F (G) at any prole G 2 G.
Proposition 1 If a CIF F 2 F satises (C) and (IOV1), then F (G) 
K(G) for all G 2 G.
Proof. Let F 2 F satisfy (C) and (IOV1). We start by observing that the
claim F (G)  K(G) for all G 2 Gis equivalent to for all G 2 G and for
all i 2 N : i 62 K(G) implies i 62 F (G). Hence, we prove this equivalent
claim by induction of jGj, where jGj = jG1j+ jG2j+ : : :+ jGnj.
Basis Step: When jGj = 0, we have Gl = ; for all l 2 N . Thus, i =2 Gj for
all i; j 2 N . From (C), F (G) = K(G) = ;.
Induction Step: Let g be a non-negative integer such that g < n2. Assume
that the claim holds for all G 2 G with jGj = g, and we show that the claim
holds for all G 2 G with jGj = g + 1.
Let G 2 G be such that jGj = g+1, and let i 2 N be such that i 62 K(G).
If i 62 Gj for all j 2 N , then from (C) we have i 62 F (G). Suppose there exists
j 2 N such that i 2 Gj. By denition of K, from i 62 K(G) and i 2 Gj,
it then follows that j 62 K(G). Moreover, from i 62 K(G), there also exists
k 2 N such that i 62 Gk. Observe that k 6= j.
Let G0 2 G be such that G0 = (G1; : : : Gj 1; Gj n fig ; Gj+1; : : : ; Gn). By
denition of K, we have K(G0)  K(G), which implies i; j 62 K(G0). Obvi-
ously, jG0j = jGj   1 = g. By induction hypothesis, we have F (G0)  K(G0).
Thus, we have i; j 62 F (G0) from i; j 62 K(G0).
Notice that for the prole G0 we have i 62 G0j and i; j 62 F (G0), and for
the prole G we have Gj = G0j [ fig, i 62 Gk for some k 6= j and Gl = G0l for
all l 2 N n fjg. Hence, applying (IOV1) with G0 and G in the roles of G and
G0, respectively, we conclude that i 62 F (G).
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In order to complete the characterization of K we have to show also the
reverse inclusion to the one in Proposition 1. For that purpose, we introduce
our third axiom.
 A CIF F 2 F satises equal treatment of insidersviews (ETIV) if for
all G;G0 2 G and for all i; j; k 2 N ,
 i 2 Gj,
G0j = Gj n fig, and G0k = Gk [ fig
G0l = Gl for all l 2 N n fj; kg,
imply
 [j 2 F (G) and k 2 F (G0)] ) [i 2 F (G) i¤ i 2 F (G0)].
Equal treatment of insidersviews requires that if an individual i is con-
sidered to be an appropriate group member by an individual j, i 2 Gj in a
given prole, and if in a new prole j does not consider i as an appropri-
ate group member anymore but a third individual k does, and nothing else
has changed, then, when j is a collectively accepted group member in the
original prole and k is a collectively accepted member in the new prole, it
must be true that i is a G collectively in the original prole if and only if i
is a G collectively in the new prole. This axiom essentially requires that a
CIF should treat the views of all the members who are considered to be Gs
collectively equally.
Proposition 2 If a CIF F 2 F satises (C), (ETIV) and (IOV1), then
K(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G.
Proof. Let F 2 F satisfy (C), (ETIV) and (IOV1). Note rst that the claim
K(G)  F (G) for all G 2 Gis equivalent to Kt(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G
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and for all non-negative integers t  n. We prove this equivalent claim by
induction of g = n2   jGj and t.
Basis Step (g = 0): When jGj = n2, we have Gl = N for all l 2 N . Thus,
i 2 Gj for all i; j 2 N , i.e., F (G) = N follows from (C). Therefore, we have
Kt(G)  F (G) for all non-negative integers t  n.
Induction Step (g  0): Let g be a non-negative integer such that g < n2.
We assume that
K(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G with jGj = n2   g; (IH1)
and show Kt(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G with jGj = n2   g   1 and for all
non-negative integers t  n.
Basis Step (g  0 and t = 0): From (C), we have K0(G)  F (G) for all
G 2 G.
Induction Step (g  0 and t  0): Let t be a non-negative integer such that
t < n. We further assume that
Kt(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G with jGj = n2   g   1; (IH2)
and we show Kt+1(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G with jGj = n2   g   1.
Let G 2 G be such that jGj = n2   g   1. If Kt+1(G) nKt(G) = ;, then
we have K(G) = Kt(G)  F (G). Suppose there exists i 2 Kt+1(G) nKt(G).
Then, by denition of K, there exists j 2 Kt(G) such that i 2 Gj. Hence, we
have j 6= i, and by induction hypothesis (IH2), we conclude that j 2 F (G).
Moreover, since i 62 K0(G), there exists k 2 N such that i 62 Gk. Observe
that k 6= j.
Let H 2 G be such that H = (G1; : : : ; Gk 1; Gk [ fig ; Gk+1; : : : ; Gn). We
consider now the following two cases:
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(1) Suppose k 2 F (H). Notice from i 62 Gk that jHj = jGj+ 1 = n2   g,
and thus, by induction hypothesis (IH1), K(H)  F (H). From Proposi-
tion 1, we have F (H)  K(H), and thus, F (H) = K(H). By denition of
K, K(G)  K(H), we have i 2 Kt+1(G)  K(G)  K(H) = F (H). Then,
notice that for the prole H we have i 2 Hk and i; k 2 F (H), and for the
prole G we have i 2 Gj, Gk = Hk n fig, Gl = Hl for all l 2 N n fkg, and
j 2 F (G). Hence, applying (ETIV) with H, G, i, k, j in the roles of G, G0,
i, j, k, respectively, we conclude that i 2 F (G).
(2) Suppose k 62 F (H). From K(H) = F (H), we have K(G)  K(H) =
F (H), and thus, k 62 K(G). From Proposition 1, we have F (G)  K(G), and
thus, k 62 F (G). Moreover, from i; j 2 Kt+1(G)  K(G) and k 62 K(G), we
have k 62 Gi and k 62 Gj. Let H 0 2 G be such that H 0 = (G1; : : : ; Gi 1; Gi [
fkg; Gk+1; : : : ; Gn). From k 62 Gi, we have jH 0j = jGj + 1 = n2   g. By
induction hypothesis (IH1) and Proposition 1, we have F (H 0) = K(H 0).
From i 2 K(G)  K(H 0) and k 2 H 0i, we have k 2 K(H 0), and from
F (H 0) = K(H 0), we have k 2 F (H 0). Notice that for the prole G we have
k 62 Gi and k 62 F (G), and for the prole H 0 we have H 0i = Gi[fkg, H 0l = Gl
for all l 2 N n fig, k 2 F (H 0), and from j 6= i, we have k 62 Gj = H 0j. Then,
applying (IOV1) with G, H 0, k, i, j in the roles of G, G0, i, j, k, respectively,
we conclude that i 2 F (G).
Theorem 1 A CIF F 2 F satises (C), (ETIV) and (IOV1) if and only if
F = K. Moreover, all three axioms are independent.
Proof. It is easy to check that the consensus-start-respecting procedure
satises (C), (ETIV) and (IOV1). The combination of Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2 proves that, if a CIF F 2 F satises (C), (ETIV) and (IOV1)
then it is K. Hence, we need only to show that the axioms are tight. The
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proof consists of three examples, each of which satises exactly two of the
three axioms.
(:(C)) Let F 2 F be such that F (G) = ; for all G 2 G. Clearly, this
CIF satises all axioms but (C).
(:(ETIV)) Consider the CIF F 2 F with
F (G) = K0(G) [ fi 2 N : i 2 Gj for all j 2 K0(G)g
for all G 2 G. The following example shows that this aggregator does not
satisfy (ETIV). Let N = f1; 2; 3g, G = (f1; 2; 3g ; f1g ; f1g), and G0 =
(f1; 3g ; f1g ; f1; 2g). For these proles of views we have F (G) = f1; 2; 3g
and F (G0) = f1; 3g. In this case (ETIV) is violated because 1 2 F (G),
3 2 F (G0), 2 2 G1, G01 = G1 n f2g, G03 = G3 [ f2g, but 2 2 F (G) and
2 =2 F (G0).
(:(IOV1)) Take the liberal-start-respecting procedure that denes the
CIF L 2 F . If we set j = i in the formulation of (IOV1) we immediately see
that this axiom is violated.
4 The liberal-start-respecting procedure
For the axiomatic characterization of the liberal-start-respecting procedure
dened in Section 2 we have rst to modify the irrelevance of an outsides
view 1 axiom.
 A CIF F 2 F satises irrelevance of an outsiders view 2 (IOV2) if for
all G;G0 2 G and for all i; j 2 N with i 6= j,
G0j = Gj [ fig, and
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G0l = Gl for all l 2 N n fjg,
imply
 [j 62 F (G)] ) [i 2 F (G) i¤ i 2 F (G0)].
This axiom basically says, like (IOV1), that if someone is collectively
considered as a non-G, then this persons view about any society member
is not relevant in deciding his or her collective identity. Recall that in the
formulation of (IOV1) it was crucial to avoid the case, in which everyone
in the society except the outsider j considers i as a G, so that the change
of js view in favour of i is relevant for the social identication of i (i.e., in
this way a possible tension between (IOV1) and (C) was excluded). Notice
that the liberal-start-respecting procedure does not satisfy (IOV1) because
ones self-determination denes immediately ones social status: there is no
consensus needed in this case. Therefore, in order to avoid the situation in
which an individual becomes crucial for his own social determination (from
being outsider to being insider) we require i 6= j in the formulation of (IOV2).
As it turns out, the combination of (C) and (IOV2) plays a similar role for
a CIF F 2 F as the role of the combination of (C) and (IOV1): it produces
an upper bound for F at any prole G 2 G. This upper bound is exactly the
set of socially accepted group members at G according to the liberal-start-
respecting procedure.
Proposition 3 If a CIF F 2 F satises (C) and (IOV2), then F (G)  L(G)
for all G 2 G.
Proof. Let F 2 F satisfy (C) and (IOV2). Observe again that the claim
F (G)  L(G) for all G 2 G is equivalent to for all G 2 G and for all
i 2 N : i 62 L(G) implies i 62 F (G). Hence, we prove this equivalent claim
by induction of jGj, where jGj = jG1j+ jG2j+ : : :+ jGnj.
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Basis Step: When jGj = 0, we have Gl = ; for all l 2 N . Thus, i =2 Gj for
all i; j 2 N . From (C), F (G) = L(G) = ;.
Induction Step: Let g be a non-negative integer such that g < n2. Assume
that the claim holds for all G 2 G with jGj = g, and we show that the claim
holds for all G 2 G with jGj = g + 1.
Let G 2 G be such that jGj = g+1, and let i 2 N be such that i 62 L(G).
If i 62 Gj for all j 2 N , then from (C) we have i 62 F (G). Suppose there
exists j 2 N such that i 2 Gj. Note that j 6= i. By denition of L, i 62 L(G)
and i 2 Gj imply j 62 L(G).
Let G0 2 G be such that G0 = (G1; : : : Gj 1; Gj n fig ; Gj+1; : : : ; Gn). By
denition of L, we have L(G0)  L(G), which implies i; j 62 L(G0). Obviously,
jG0j = jGj   1 = g. By induction hypothesis, we have F (G0)  L(G0). Thus,
we have i; j 62 F (G0) from i; j 62 L(G0).
Notice that for the prole G0 we have i; j 62 F (G0), and for the prole G
we have Gj = G0j[fig and Gl = G0l for all l 2 N nfjg. By noticing that i 6= j
and applying (IOV2) with G0 and G in the roles of G and G0, respectively,
we conclude that i 62 F (G).
Finally, we introduce the following monotonicity requirement.
 A CIF F 2 F satises monotonicity (MON) if for all G;G0 2 G,
 [Gk  G0k for every k 2 N ] implies [F (G)  F (G0)].
In this axiom, used also by Samet and Schmeidler (2003), proles G and
G0 are considered such that every individual who deserves to be a group
member according to someone in the prole G is dened as a group member
by the same person also in G0. Then, (MON) requires that in this case every
individual who is socially accepted in G is accepted in G0 as well.
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It turns out that combining (C), (MON), (ETIV) and (IOV2) results in
the existence of a lower bound for a CIF F 2 F at a given prole G 2 G; this
lower bound is exactly the result of the liberal-start-respecting procedure at
the same prole.
Proposition 4 If a CIF F 2 F satises (C), (MON), (ETIV) and (IOV2),
then L(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G.
Proof. Let F 2 F satisfy (C), (MON), (ETIV) and (IOV2). In the following,
in order to prove L(G)  F (G), we prove Lt(G)  F (G) for all proles G 2 G
by induction on t.
Basis Step: We rst show L0(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G. Suppose to
the contrary that there exists a prole G 2 G such that i 2 L0(G) but
i 62 F (G) for some i 2 N . Notice then that, by i 62 F (G) and (C), the set
Q := fj 2 N : i =2 Gjg is nonempty; clearly, i =2 Q. Let G0 2 G be a prole
such that G0k = Gk n Q for all k 2 N . Then, by i 62 F (G) and (MON),
i =2 F (G0). By (C), Q \ F (G0) = ;. Let j 2 Q and consider the prole
G00 2 G where G00k = G0k for all k 2 N nfjg, and G00j = G0j [fig. By i =2 F (G0)
and (IOV2), i =2 F (G00). Notice again that, by (C), Q \ F (G00) = ;. By
repeating the same argument (jQj   1)-times, we arrive at prole G 2 G
with Gk = G
0
k for all k 2 N n Q, and Gk = G0k [ fig for all k 2 Q. Thus,
by (IOV2), i =2 F (G). Observe however that i 2 Gk for all k 2 Q and
i 2 G0k = Gk for all k 2 N n Q. By (C), i 2 F (G), a contradiction. We
conclude that L0(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G must hold.
Induction Step: Let t be a nonnegative integer. We assume that Lt(G) 
F (G) for all G 2 G and show that Lt+1(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G. Let i 2
Lt+1(G). If i 2 Lt(G), then i 2 F (G) from Lt(G)  F (G). Assume therefore
i 62 Lt(G). From the denition of L, there exists j 2 Lt(G) such that i 2 Gj.
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Note that j 2 F (G), which follows from j 2 Lt(G)  F (G), and that i 6= j,
which is due to i 62 Lt(G) and j 2 Lt(G). Let G0 2 G be a prole such that
G0 = (G1; : : : ; Gi 1; Gi [ fig ; Gi+1; : : : ; Gj 1; Gj n fig ; Gj+1; : : : ; Gn). From
the denition of L0, i 2 L0(G0). From L0(G0)  F (G0), it follows that
i 2 F (G0). Noting that j 2 F (G) and i 2 F (G0), by (ETIV), we obtain
i 2 F (G). Therefore, L(G)  F (G) for all G 2 G.
Theorem 2 A CIF F 2 F satises (C), (MON), (ETIV) and (IOV2) if
and only if F = L. Moreover, all four axioms are independent.
Proof. It is easy to check that the liberal-start-respecting procedure satises
(C), (MON), (ETIV) and (IOV2). The combination of Proposition 3 and
Proposition 4 proves that, if a CIF F 2 F satises (C), (MON), (ETIV) and
(IOV2) then it is L. Hence, we need only to show that the axioms are tight.
The proof consists of four examples, each of which satises exactly three of
the four axioms.
(:(C)) Let F 2 F be such that F (G) = N for all G 2 G. Clearly, this
CIF satises all axioms but (C).
(:(MON)) Let N = f1; 2g and consider the CIF F dened as follows.
F (G) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
; if G 2 f(;; ;) ; (;; f1g) ; (f2g ; ;) ; (f2g ; f1g)g ;
f1g if G 2 f(f1g ; f1; 2g) ; (f1g ; f1g) ; (f1g ; ;)g ;
f2g if G 2 f(f2g ; f2g) ; (;; f2g)g ;
f1; 2g otherwise.
This CIF satises all axioms except (MON). To see that (MON) is vio-
lated, take G = (f1g ; f1; 2g), G0 = (f1g ; f2g). According to the proposed
aggregator we have F (G) = f1g and F (G0) = f1; 2g. Notice that G0k = Gk
for k = 1; 3, and G02  G2. Nevertheless, F (G)  F (G0).
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(:(ETIV)) Take Kasher and Rubinsteins liberalaggregator, i.e., con-
sider L0 2 F with L0(G) = fi 2 N : i 2 Gig for all G 2 G. In order to see
that L0 violates (ETIV), take j 2 L0(G), i =2 L0(G), k 2 L0(G0), and set
k = i.
(:(IOV2)) Let F 2 F be dened as follows:
F (G) = fi 2 N : i 2 Gj for some j 2 Ng
for all G 2 G. Clearly, this CIF does not satisfy (IOV2) because the change
of an outsiders opinion in favour of i changes is social status.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have axiomatically characterized the procedures that dene
the collective identity functions K and L in the framework proposed by
Kasher and Rubinstein (1997).
The consensus-start-respecting procedure is characterized by consensus,
irrelevance of an outsiders view 1, and equal treatment of insidersviews.
The axioms (C) and (IOV1) guarantee that any CIF satisfying them selects
only socially accepted group members that K would also select. The charac-
terization of K is based on the following simple observation: given a prole
G 2 G, the axiom (C) guarantees that, for any CIF F 2 F that satises it,
F (G) contains K0(G). The application of (IOV1) gives the result that there
is no individual in K1(G) whose social status is determined by someone out-
side of K0(G), and (ETIV) implies that only individuals in K0(G) are crucial
for determining an individuals social status. The induction argument in the
proofs completes the characterization.
A similar observation can be made with respect to the liberal-start-
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respecting procedure that is characterized by consensus, monotonicity, equal
treatment of insidersviews, and irrelevance of an outsiders view 2. Here
(MON) is crucial for guaranteeing, together with (C) and (IOV2), that, for
any prole G 2 G and any CIF F 2 F satisfying these axioms, F (G) con-
tains L0 (G). It may be noted that the roles an outsider plays in determining
someones social status in these two procedures are quite di¤erent: for K, an
outsiders change of his opinion in favor of himself is inconsequential, while
for L, an outsider who changes his opinion in favour of himself becomes
crucial in determining his own social status.
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